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INTRODUCTION
THIS ARTICLE SUMMARIZES decisions and developmentsin the field of aviation law from 2019. It does not attempt to
address every reported aviation case. Rather, it focuses on the
areas of aviation law that likely will have the most significant
ramifications in the upcoming year. The categories referenced
are for organization, but some cases fall into multiple
categories.
I. MONTREAL AND WARSAW CONVENTIONS
A. JURISDICTION
There was an interesting update to the Montreal Conven-
tion’s (MC) “Fifth Jurisdiction”1 in 2019. In Erwin-Simpson v.
AirAsia Berhad, a passenger and her husband sued AirAsia
Berhad (AirAsia) in the District of Columbia District Court for
personal injuries arising from spilled boiling water during a
flight from Malaysia to Cambodia operated by Malaysian-based
airline AirAsia.2 Given those facts, as well as the facts that AirAsia
had no U.S. presence, “[did] not operate any flights to the
[U.S.],” and did not maintain offices or employees in the U.S.,
AirAsia challenged subject matter jurisdiction under Article
33(2) of the MC, known as “the fifth jurisdiction.”3 Ultimately,
the court held that there was no subject matter jurisdiction
under Article 33(2).4
Under Article 33(2) of the MC, a passenger may bring a per-
sonal injury or death action in a forum state where (1) “at the
time of the accident, the passenger has his or her principal and
permanent residence”; (2) the air carrier operates flights “on its
own aircraft or on another carrier’s aircraft pursuant to a com-
mercial agreement” (e.g., code-share agreement); and (3) the
air carrier “conducts its business of carriage of passengers by air
from premises leased or owned by the carrier itself or by an-
other carrier with which it has a commercial agreement.”5 Based
1 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air art. 33, opened for signature May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. 13038, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309
[hereinafter MC].
2 Erwin-Simpson v. AirAsia Berhad, 375 F. Supp. 3d 8, 10–11 (D.D.C. 2019).
3 Id. at 11, 14, 16.
4 Id. at 14. The Court also ruled on defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, addressed infra Section V (Personal Jurisdiction). Id. at
10–11, 19.
5 Id. at 13 (quoting MC, supra note 1, art. 33(2)).
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on interpretation of the second and third prongs above, the
court agreed with AirAsia that it must not only operate service to
or from the United States on its own or indirectly through an-
other carrier, but also must conduct business from some physical
location leased or owned by the carrier itself or a location for
which it has an agreement.6
The court first examined the text of the MC and concluded
that Article 33(2)’s language strongly indicates that there must
be a physical presence—either directly or through an agree-
ment with another carrier.7 Even if another carrier leases or
owns the premises, the text still requires that the carrier being
sued operate some aspect of its business from those premises.8
To support its interpretation, the court next examined the
ratification history of this provision, which was designed to fill a
gap by allowing Americans injured abroad to sue in the United
States.9 And, while Article 33(2) was designed to “sweep
broadly,” it is limited by the language requiring a business pres-
ence in the forum state.10 The court held that the “‘presence’
requirement reflects a compromise between the United States
interest in allowing [American citizens] injured on international
flights to sue in the U.S., on the one hand, with other countries’
concerns about too broad a jurisdictional reach, on the other.”11
The court rejected plaintiffs’ reliance on an affiliated airline’s
flight operations to and from Hawaii, finding it was not the “car-
rier” that operated plaintiff’s flight and, in any event, it did not
change the fact that AirAsia lacked a business presence in the
United States.12
Lastly, the court dismissed plaintiff’s argument that Article
33(2) should be broad enough to treat the carrier’s website as a
“virtual premises” in the United States.13 Relying on the treaty’s
text and negotiation history, the court found that the MC’s
drafters intended traditional physical premises for the “fifth ju-
risdiction.”14 The court concluded that “[e]mbracing the theory
that a website accessible to Americans suffices for subject matter
6 Id. at 18–19.
7 Id. at 18.
8 Id. at 14–15.
9 Id. at 15–16.
10 Id. at 16.
11 Id. at 17 (quoting MC, supra note 1, art. 33(2)).
12 Id. at 17–19.
13 Id. at 18.
14 Id. at 16–18.
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jurisdiction would stretch the fifth jurisdiction too far.”15 As
every single airline has a website that can be accessed in the
United States and allows tickets to be purchased thereon, to al-
low such a broad interpretation of premises would “upset the
careful political balance [the treaty] strikes.”16
In 2019, U.S. courts were routinely confronted with the ques-
tion as to what was included in MC Article 18’s definition of
“during the carriage of air.”17 In Spectre Air Capital, LLC v. Crane
Worldwide Logistics LLC, plaintiff Spectre Air Capital, LLC (Spec-
tre) sued for damages its two engines sustained during transpor-
tation.18 “Spectre entered into a lease with Delta Airlines [ ] for
the engines and [hired] defendant Crane Worldwide Logistics
LLC (‘Crane’) to transport the engines from Tianjin, China, to
Delta TechOps at Gate 6” of the Hartsfield-Jackson Airport in
Atlanta, Georgia.19 Most interestingly, the damage occurred to
the engines while they were on the ground in Atlanta, after the
flight had concluded.20 In fact, the parties did not dispute that
the damage to the engines occurred when Crane’s subcontrac-
tor tightened straps over the top of the engines “on the very last
portion of the evening when [the subcontractor] was instructed
to go back to Gate 6 from Gate 4.”21
“Spectre sued Crane in the 157th District Court of Harris
County, Texas for breach of contract, negligence, gross negli-
gence, fraud, and fraud in the inducement.”22 Then, “Crane re-
moved the case to [federal court] claiming federal jurisdiction
over international air carriage.”23 Spectre moved to remand the
case and argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because the
MC was inapplicable to the case.24
Under Article 18, the court reasoned that because this dam-
age occurred on airport premises “while in the charge of the
carrier,” the damage to the engines was sustained “during the
carriage by air,” and that the MC governed liability in this case.25
15 Id. at 19.
16 Id.
17 MC, supra note 1, art. 18.
18 Spectre Air Capital, LLC v. Crane Worldwide Logistics LLC, No. CV H-19-
0997, 2019 WL 4765196, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2019).
19 Id.
20 Id. at *2.
21 Id.
22 Id. at *1.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at *2.
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Accordingly, defendant’s motion for remand back to state court
was denied.26
B. “ACCIDENT”
Courts across the country also examined the definition of “ac-
cident.” In Armstrong v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., plaintiff sued for
injuries he sustained allegedly as a result of a Qantas Airlines
(Qantas) employee’s refusal to help plaintiff retrieve his
checked bags at baggage claim.27 Plaintiff, who was disabled, al-
leged that he had paid for “curb-to-curb” service, and that this
included the airline attendant helping him with his bags at bag-
gage claim.28 The Qantas employee denied that they were em-
ployed to help plaintiff with his bags.29 Plaintiff, upon taking his
own bags off the baggage carousel, tore ligaments in his fore-
arm, which ultimately required surgery.30 Plaintiff sued under
the MC Article 17.31
Defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming the MC
did not apply because an “accident” did not cause plaintiff’s
forearm injury.32 The case turned on the specific question of
whether the Qantas employee’s rejection of plaintiff’s requests
for assistance constituted an “accident” under Article 17 of the
MC.33
Article 17(1) of the MC states that “a plaintiff must prove the
following elements: (1) there has been an ‘accident’; (2) that
caused the passenger’s injury; and (3) that the accident oc-
curred while onboard the aircraft or in the course of operations
of embarking or disembarking.”34 “The United States Supreme
Court has defined ‘accident’ under the [MC] as ‘an unexpected
or unusual event or happening that is external to the
passenger.’”35
“The Supreme Court’s definition of “accident” can be broken
down into three parts”: (1) an “event or happening”; (2) “that is
26 Id. at *1.
27 Armstrong v. Haw. Airlines, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1034–36 (D. Haw.
2019).
28 Id. at 1037.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1036.
31 Id. at 1037.
32 Id. at 1041.
33 Id. at 1040.
34 Id. (citing MC, supra note 1, art. 17(1)).
35 Id. (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985)).
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unexpected or unusual”; and (3) “that is external to the
passenger.”36
(1) “Event or Happening”: “An ‘event or happening’ can take
the form of action or inaction.”37 The court focused on
the Qantas employee’s refusal of plaintiff’s explicit re-
quests for assistance with retrieving his bags from the bag-
gage carousel and determined that refusal was “an act of
commission, rather than omission, because it was inac-
tion that produced an effect, result, or consequence.”38
“[U]nder Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent,
there was an issue of material fact as to whether that re-
fusal constitutes an event or happening.”39
(2) “Unusual or Unexpected”: Thus, “[p]laintiff . . . injured
his arm while retrieving his checked bags as a conse-
quence of the wheelchair attendant’s refusal to assist
him.”40 “Had [p]laintiff not asked for the wheelchair at-
tendant’s assistance, there would be no question that a
mere act or omission occurred, and [p]laintiff would not
have a cause of action under Article 17.”41
(3) “External to the Passenger”: The event itself must occur
external to the passenger.42 Here, it is not disputed that
the wheelchair is external to the passenger.43
Ultimately, the court determined that the MC applied to this
injury because a jury could find that the attendant’s refusal could
have caused plaintiff’s injury.44 The court consequently denied
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.45
Sensat v. Southwest Airlines is another case that addressed “acci-
dent” under the MC.46 A passenger was boarding a flight to the
United States in the Dominican Republic when he tripped on
the metal boarding stairs leading to the plane.47 He alleged his
36 Id. at 1041.
37 Id. (citing Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 653–54 (2004)).
38 Id. at 1042.
39 Id. (citing Caman v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 455 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir.
2006); Husain, 540 U.S. at 652).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1043.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 1048–49.
45 Id. at 1049.
46 Sensat v. Sw. Airlines, 363 F. Supp. 3d 815, 816 (E.D. Mich. 2019).
47 Id.
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foot got stuck in a gap in the stairs and that he suffered multiple
torn ligaments in his foot and required surgery.48
Defendant moved for summary judgment under the MC,
claiming that this was not the type of “accident” explicitly cov-
ered by the MC.49 The court reasoned that, because “accident”
under the MC requires a jury to find that an “unusual” event
had taken place, a jury could indeed find that a gap in air stairs
was “unusual” enough for MC coverage.50 This finding as to for-
tuity was bolstered by the fact that every witness testified that this
had never happened before, and because the pilot stood on the
stairs after the incident, warning everyone to watch their step.51
In Expeditors International of Washington, Inc. v. United Parcel Ser-
vice, United Parcel Service (UPS) allegedly ruined several com-
puters while they were en route from London to Denver.52
Plaintiff prevailed on its motion for summary judgment when
plaintiff’s computers were clearly damaged in cargo.53 Plaintiff
charged that, under the MC, Subsection 1 of Article 18, UPS
(a.k.a. the air carrier), “is liable for damage sustained in the
event of . . . damage to cargo upon condition that the event
which caused the damage so sustained took place during car-
riage by air.”54
Because Subsection 2 of Article 18 provides that “the [air] car-
rier is not liable if and to the extent it proves that the . . . dam-
age[ ] to the cargo resulted from . . . defective packaging of that
cargo performed by a person other than the carrier,”55 the court
looked to UPS to present evidence that the cargo was damaged
by anyone other than UPS.56 The court held that UPS failed to
present sufficient evidence to defend itself under the MC stan-
dard, and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was
granted.57
48 Id. at 816–17.
49 Id. at 816.
50 Id. at 823.
51 Id.
52 Expeditors Int’l of Wash., Inc. v. United Parcel Serv. Co., 370 F. Supp. 3d
1265, 1266 (D. Colo. 2019), appeal dism’d, No. 19-1115, 2019 WL 4725681 (10th
Cir. July 1, 2019).
53 Id. at 1270–71.
54 Id. at 1269.
55 MC, supra note 1, art. 18(2).
56 Expeditors Int’l, 370 F. Supp. at 1269–70.
57 Id. at 1271.
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C. VENUE
In Agasino v. American Airlines Inc., the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California affirmed that the MC does
not contain specific venue rules that supersede the United
States’ general venue statutes.58 This specific case concerned in-
juries sustained by a passenger on a flight from Tokyo, Japan, to
Dallas, Texas, when a bag fell from an overhead bin and struck
him in the head.59 Plaintiff sued in the Northern District of Cali-
fornia despite the fact that plaintiff did not live in California,
nor did he allege any connection to California.60 Because plain-
tiff also failed to allege that American Airlines (AA) itself had
any connection to California, AA moved to dismiss for improper
venue under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3).61 AA did
not raise a personal jurisdiction challenge at the time of filing its
12(b)(3) motion for improper venue.62
In opposition to AA’s motion, plaintiff argued that venue for
his “case was governed by the [MC],” and that the MC “contains
its own venue rules and that those rules supersede the general
venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391.”63 The court swiftly and suc-
cinctly quashed his argument in one sentence, simply replying,
“Not so.”64 The MC “does not govern venue within the United
States”—the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do.65
Nonetheless, the court held that the chosen venue was per-
missible because defendant moved to dismiss solely for im-
proper venue, but did not challenge personal jurisdiction over
AA, which would be one of the venue criterion.66 The court did
ultimately grant a motion to transfer venue to Texas, based on
traditional venue transfer factors:
(1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) the convenience of the
parties; (3) the convenience of the witnesses; (4) the relative ease
of access to the evidence; (5) the familiarity of each forum with
the applicable law; (6) the feasibility of consolidation with other
58 Agasino v. Am. Airlines Inc., No. 19-CV-03243-LB, 2019 WL 3387803, at *2
(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2019).
59 Id. at *1.
60 Id.
61 Id. at *1–2.
62 Id. at *3.
63 Id. at *2.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at *3.
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claims; (7) any local interest in the controversy; and (8) the rela-
tive court congestion and time to trial in each forum.67
In McCormick v. Aerovias De Mexico S.A. de C.V., plaintiffs sued
Delta Airlines (Delta) for injuries sustained on AeroMexico
Flight 2431 when it crashed shortly after attempting to take off
from Durango, Mexico.68 Plaintiffs purchased airline tickets
from Delta’s website on June 2, 2018.69
Plaintiffs’ ticket confirmations indicated the following: (1) at
3:09 p.m. on July 31, 2018, plaintiffs would fly from Durango,
Mexico, to Mexico City, Mexico, on “AeroMexico Flight 2431,”
which [was] “[o]perated by” Aerolitoral S.A. de C.V. (Aer-
olitoral), a subsidiary of AeroMexico Aerovias De Mexico S.A. de
C.V. (AeroMexico); and (2) at 6:40 p.m. on July 31, 2018, plain-
tiffs would fly from Mexico City, Mexico, to Portland, Oregon, on
“Delta Flight 8072,” which [was] “[o]perated by” AeroMexico.70
According to Delta’s Manager of Interline and Industry Af-
fairs, “Delta sold tickets for AeroMexico flight 2431, operated by
Aerolitoral, because Delta had an Interline Passenger Ticketing
and Baggage Agreement (‘Interline Agreement’) with Aer-
olitoral.”71 The Interline Agreement, “which went into effect on
November 1, 2000,” provides that the airline that issues the tick-
ets (here, Delta) “acts only as agent of the carrying airline” and
is not responsible for “any injury to or death of a passenger, or
any loss of or damage to a passenger’s personal effects, or any
loss of or damage to baggage caused by or occurring on or in
connection with the premises of the airplane[.]”72
“Delta also had a Codeshare Agreement with AeroMexico,
which was in effect on July 31, 2018.”73 According to Delta, “the
Codeshare Agreement ‘applied only to AeroMexico flights that
were designated as codeshare flights by Delta.’”74 Codeshare
flights by Delta are classified as such when “Delta markets and
sells . . . its own transportation services for a flight that . . . is
67 Id. at *4 (citing EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., No. C 09-2469 PJH, 2009 WL
7323651, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2009)).
68 McCormick v. Aerovias De Mexico S.A. de C.V., No. 3:18-CV-01628-SB, 2019
WL 1552498, at *1–2 (D. Or. Feb. 27, 2019).




73 Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
74 Id.
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operated by another air carrier.”75 The court concluded that
Delta could not be held liable under Article 36 of the MC be-
cause it was not the actual carrier of AeroMexico Flight 2431
during which the accident occurred.76
Plaintiff also argued Delta was liable under MC Article 39 “as
a ‘contracting carrier.’”77 Courts focus “on whether the flight at
issue was a codeshare flight” when determining “contracting car-
rier” liability under the MC.78 In this case, plaintiffs did not dis-
pute that they were injured on AeroMexico Flight 2431, a flight
that did not bear Delta’s name or code.79 The court concluded
that AeroMexico Flight 2431 was not a Delta codeshare flight
and therefore Delta could not be held liable as a contracting
carrier under Article 39.80
D. CARRIERS
In Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v. Expeditors In-
ternational of Washington, Inc., an insurer was subrogee of the
shipper of a CAT scan machine that was damaged in transport
from Tokyo to Shanghai.81 The insurer brought an action
against common carriers asserting claims for breach of contract
and breach of bailment obligations.82 Defendant moved to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim on the grounds that the United
States is not a proper forum for this action because only one
defendant (EXPJapan)—which had neither a domicile nor prin-
cipal place of business in the United States—was the “carrier”
for this shipment.83 The motion also asserted that the insurer
failed to provide notice of a claim to the carrier pursuant to the
MC.84
The court denied the motion and held that Expeditors Inter-
national of Washington, Inc. (EIW) that negotiated rates for
shipment of the machine during international aviation transpor-
75 See id. n.3 (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 257.3 (2019), which defines codeshare as “an
arrangement whereby a carrier’s designator code is used to identify a flight oper-
ated by another carrier”).
76 Id. at *3.
77 Id. at *4.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at *7–8.
81 Indem. Ins. Co. of N.A. v. Expeditors Int’l of Wash., Inc., 382 F. Supp. 3d
302, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
82 Id. at 307.
83 Id. at 308.
84 Id. at 311.
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tation was an “indirect carrier” within meaning of the MC.85 The
Southern District of New York defined two classes of carriers—
direct and indirect—both of which are covered by the MC.86
“[D]irect air carriers are those who operate aircraft, while indi-
rect air carriers hold out a transportation service to the public
under which they utilize the services of a direct carrier for the
actual transportation by air.”87
The court also held that the alleged failure by the insurer to
provide notice of a claim to the carrier pursuant to the MC was
not a ground for dismissal for failure to state a claim:
While [d]efendants may be correct that [p]laintiff was required
to provide notice of its dissatisfaction with the condition of the
shipment—and that [p]laintiff’s failure to provide such notice
may ultimately bar it from recovery—[d]efendants have offered
no support for the contention that Article 31.2 of the Montreal
Convention creates an affirmative pleading standard.88 Accord-
ingly, the court granted EXPJapan’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dis-
miss and denied EIW’s motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6).89
E. LIMITATION PERIOD
In LAM Wholesale v. United Airlines, Inc., plaintiff LAM Whole-
sale, LLC (LAM) brought a contract action to recover alleged
damages for the loss of electronic scooters shipped by defendant
United Airlines, Inc. (United).90 The accident occurred some-
time in 2015, and the suit was first filed on May 30, 2019.91
United moved to dismiss the complaint as time barred.92 MC
Article 35, “entitled ‘Limitation on Actions,’ further requires
that ‘any claim be brought within a two-year period computed
from either the date of arrival, the date of intended arrival, or
the date that carriage ceased.’”93 “Questions as to the calcula-
tion of the period of limitations are left to the court of the fo-
85 Id. at 309.
86 Id. at 308.




90 LAM Wholesale, LLC v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 18-CV-3794 (DLI)(LB),
2019 WL 1439098, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2019).
91 Id. (quoting MC, supra note 1, art. 35).
92 Id.
93 Id. at *2.
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rum” and are not tolled, and the court granted United’s
motion.94
Louis Vuitton North America v. Schenker involved the loss of over
$760,000 in Louis Vuitton merchandise.95 To fly the merchan-
dise from Paris to New York, Louis Vuitton North America
(LVNA) hired Schenker, which subcontracted the cargo’s air
carriage to Air France.96 Upon arrival at John F. Kennedy Air-
port (JFK) in New York, the merchandise was transported by de-
fendant Cargo Airport Services USA, LLC (CAS) to its storage
warehouse at JFK, where it was held in storage.97 That same
night at approximately 10 p.m., three men arrived in an un-
marked van, presented a fake driver’s license and fake Air Auto-
mated Manifest System (AIR AMS) documents, and absconded
with the merchandise.98 LVNA sued CAS, Schenker, and Air
France for the loss.99 CAS and Air France moved to:
(1) dismiss LVNA’s claim for statutory indemnification under Ar-
ticle 10 of the Montreal Convention, and (2) enter judgment on
their affirmative defenses that: (a) any common law claims that
could be inferred from the Amended Complaint are preempted
by the Montreal Convention, and (b) CAS’s liability is limited to
that of a carrier under Article 22.3 because it was “acting in the
scope of its employment.”100
The court held that Article 10 of the MC applies to carriers and
does not apply to actual third-party transporters.101 CAS’s mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings was denied in part and
granted in part, dismissing LVNA’s claim for statutory
indemnification.102
Another case concerning the MC’s “cause of injury” was Abba
v. British Airways.103 In Abba, while flying on a British Airlines
flight from Milwaukee to Paris, a male passenger hurt his finger
after he tripped on a beverage cart which was operated by a
94 Id. at *2–3.
95 Louis Vuitton N. Am., Inc. v. Schenker S.A., No. 17-CV-7445 (DLI)(PK),
2019 WL 1507792, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2019).
96 Id. at *1.
97 Id. at *2.
98 Id.
99 Id. at *1.
100 Id. at *4.
101 Id. at *6.
102 Id. at *10.
103 Abba v. British Airways PLC, No. 17 C 6138, 2019 WL 1354300, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 26, 2019).
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flight attendant.104 Defendant British Airways moved for sum-
mary judgment, claiming the fall was not the airline’s fault.105
But the court denied the motion, holding that a jury may be
able to weigh the evidence and conclude that this injury was
caused by the flight attendant.106
The court reasoned denial was proper because (1) the entire
chain of events was completely unclear based on plaintiff’s and
flight attendant’s conflicting testimony; and (2) British Airways
did not conclusively disprove the plaintiff’s injury was its fault.107
F. PLEADING
DHL Global Forwarding (China) Co. v. Lan Cargo, S.A. con-
cerned a stolen shipment of over 20,000 Apple iPhones.108 The
court struck a cause of action from the complaint, which pled
both a cause of action under the MC and also sought for declar-
atory relief regarding the same MC claim.109 The Southern Dis-
trict of Florida held it was “superfluous” to make a MC claim
and then also request declaratory relief regarding the same
claim, and dismissed the latter cause of action.110
In Sokolova v. United Airlines, Inc., plaintiffs alleged “that they
suffered damages as a result of delays during [roundtrip] flights
they booked through [United] from Chicago to Tbilisi, in the
Republic of Georgia.”111 United “moved pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) to dismiss two counts and strike
portions of the plaintiffs’ complaint.”112
United argued that counts two and four, which asserted enti-
tlement to relief under breach of contract theories, “should be
dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
because United did not breach any term of the applicable con-
tract of carriage as a matter of law and because those counts are
duplicative of count one.”113 United also argued that “certain
allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint requesting relief that is
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at *3–4.
107 Id. at *4.
108 DHL Glob. Forwarding (China) Co. v. Lan Cargo, S.A., No. 18-21866-CIV,
2019 WL 2329281, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2019).
109 Id. at *1, *4.
110 Id. at *4.
111 Sokolova v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 18-CV-02576, 2019 WL 1572555, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2019).
112 Id.
113 Id. at *2.
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unavailable under the Montreal Convention should be stricken
pursuant to Rule 12(f).”114 Plaintiffs argued that there is a dis-
tinction between a legal claim and a legal theory, and that all of
[p]laintiffs’ seemingly duplicative causes of action were alterna-
tive legal theories.115 United “argue[d] in its reply brief that the
distinction between [the two was] ‘not relevant’ in this case be-
cause the Montreal Convention supplies the [p]laintiffs’ only
remedy.”116
The court denied the motion, holding that Rule 12(b)(6) au-
thorizes the dismissal of claims, but does not authorize the dis-
missal of alternative legal theories.117 United conceded that the
plaintiffs stated a plausible claim.118 The court held that “Rule
12(f) similarly fails to provide a basis to strike the plaintiffs’ alle-
gations regarding the harm they suffered.”119 United’s motion
was “therefore denied.”120
Saegusa-Beecroft v. Hawaiian Airlines was a curious decision.121
Plaintiff pled that inter-island travel between Hawaiian islands
somehow was encompassed by the MC even though it is a purely
domestic U.S. flight.122 The court held the MC does not apply to
inter-island travel within the Hawaiian islands.123
G. COMPARATIVE FAULT
Finally, we examine two cases that deal with airline liability in
light of bare minimum MC standards, and what happens when
an airline exceeds those standards by attempting to accommo-
date the guest, but the guest declines or abuses the
accommodation.
In Greig-Powell v. LIAT, plaintiff sued for personal injuries she
sustained as a result of passing out on a flight.124 Plaintiff, a dia-
betic, was scheduled to fly from St. Thomas to Trinidad, with a
114 Id.
115 Id. at *3.
116 Id. at 4.
117 Id.
118 Id. at *3.
119 Id. at *1.
120 Id. at *5.
121 Saegusa-Beecroft v. Haw. Airlines, Inc., No. 18-00384 HG-KJM, 2019 WL
1586744 (D. Haw. Apr. 12, 2019).
122 Id. at *1–2.
123 Id. at *3.
124 Greig-Powell v. LIAT (1974) Ltd., No. CV 2017-42, 2019 WL 1940595, at *1
(D.V.I. Apr. 30, 2019).
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layover in Antigua.125 Plaintiff’s initial flight from St. Thomas to
Antigua was delayed, causing her to miss her connecting flight
from Antigua to Trinidad.126 Leeward Islands Air Transport Ser-
vices (LIAT) rebooked plaintiff “on the next available flight
from Antigua to Trinidad.”127
Prior to the taking off from St. Thomas, plaintiff expressed
her concerns to the airline about her arrival time in Trinidad.128
Plaintiff told a LIAT employee that she needed to eat food by a
certain time in order to take her medication.129 The flight crew
informed her that as a policy, there was no food on LIAT
flights.130 Thereafter, the airline offered to rebook plaintiff’s
connecting flight out of Antigua for the next day and to provide
her with hotel and meal vouchers.131 Plaintiff declined these of-
fers and stayed on the flight.132 Once airborne, plaintiff once
again asked the flight attendants for food.133 Once again, she
was informed that LIAT flights do not have any food on
board.134 Plaintiff ultimately lost consciousness and hit her head
on the seat in front of her.135 She sued LIAT for her personal
injuries.136
LIAT moved for summary judgment, which was granted.137
The court held that, under MC Article 17, “[f]or liability to at-
tach, the Supreme Court requires that a passenger’s injury be
‘caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is
external to the passenger.’”138
Based on the facts of the case, the court found it “difficult to
reconcile: (1) a claim that LIAT’s inability to provide food on
the flight was unexpected or unusual,” based on LIAT’s policy of
not having food on any of its flights; with “(2) LIAT’s communi-













137 Id. at *8.
138 Id. (citing Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985)).
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meal voucher, and rebooking.139 Moreover, the court found it
“even more difficult to reconcile such a claim with Greig-Pow-
ell’s conduct, including her refusal before she was airborne, of a
meal, overnight accommodations, and a different flight at
LIAT’s expense.”140 The court ultimately held that, “[i]n light of
these circumstances, LIAT has carried its burden by demonstrat-
ing that an accident within the meaning of the Montreal Con-
vention did not occur as a matter of law.”141
And finally, in Bytska v. Swiss International Air Line Ltd., a pas-
senger sued Swiss International Air Line Ltd. (Swiss Air) for
damages she sustained when she was not allowed to board her
connecting flight from Zurich to Chicago and had to stay in Zu-
rich overnight until the next flight.142 She missed boarding be-
cause her original flight from Kyiv was delayed by two hours due
to ice.143
The airline accordingly provided plaintiff with vouchers for a
hotel stay, telephone calls, and meals, and the airline rebooked
her on the next Zurich–Chicago flight, which was the next
day.144 Plaintiff spent in excess of the vouchers while at the hotel
and airport.145 Upon her return to Chicago, she also called in
sick to work the next day due to exhaustion and an upset stom-
ach.146 She sued Swiss Air for damages as well as for her lost
wages.147
The court looked at the minimum requirements of MC’s Arti-
cle 19 to hold that Swiss Air provided plaintiff with hotel and
meal vouchers and rebooked her in order to minimize plaintiff’s
delay.148 The airline was not liable for the extra expenses she
incurred.149
II. REFUSAL TO TRANSPORT
An airline’s authority to use its discretion to refuse transporta-




142 Bytska v. Swiss Int’l Air Line Ltd., No. 15 C 00483, 2019 WL 1399925, at
*1–2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2019).
143 Id.




148 Id. at *4.
149 Id. at *5.
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vides that an air carrier “may refuse to transport a passenger or
property the carrier decided is, or might be, inimical to safety.”150
In Karrani v. JetBlue Airways Corp.,151 the plaintiff was an elderly
Somali passenger on a flight from New York to Seattle. Due to a
medical emergency, the flight had to make an emergency land-
ing in Billings, Montana.152 An incident occurred during de-
scent in which a flight attendant claimed that the plaintiff hit
her as she attempted to guide him from the forward to the aft
lavatory.153 The captain refused to allow the plaintiff to reboard
the aircraft following the stopover in Billings.154
The plaintiff sued JetBlue alleging that his removal from the
flight constituted racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981(a).155 JetBlue moved for summary judgment.156 After
finding that the “plaintiff had presented a triable issue of [mate-
rial] fact as to his prima facie case of discrimination, the burden
shift[ed] to JetBlue to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason” for denying transportation.157 The court found that Jet-
Blue met this burden pursuant to its authority under § 44902.158
Under Ninth Circuit law, “[a] passenger’s removal is proper
under [§] 44902 so long as the pilot’s decision is not arbitrary or
capricious.”159 In this case, the captain’s refusal of transporta-
tion to the plaintiff was not arbitrary and capricious as a matter
of law because he was entitled to base his decision upon the
information provided to him by the flight attendant notwith-
standing the possibility that it was false or exaggerated.160
In Cardenas v. American Airlines, Inc., AA refused to transport
an “unruly” passenger because she allegedly assaulted a cus-
tomer service manager (CSM).161 The parties agreed that due to
a delayed flight and missed connecting flight, plaintiff needed
to report to the AA helpdesk to let the agents know she had
150 49 U.S.C. § 44902 (2018) (emphasis added).
151 Karrani v. JetBlue Airways Corp., No. C18-1510-RSM, 2019 WL 3458536, at






157 Id. at *4.
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159 Id. at *5.
160 Id.
161 Cardenas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 17cv2513-GPC(JLB), 2019 WL 2918162,
at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 8, 2019).
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been rebooked through AA’s phone customer service.162 Plain-
tiff claimed she calmly approached the CSM and may have
touched him on the shoulder.163 However, the CSM demanded
to know her name and where she was going, and then informed
her that she had assaulted him and would not be allowed on
board.164 The CSM, on the other hand, testified that plaintiff
forcefully spun him around, yelled at him, and that his co-
worker called the police.165 Plaintiff was locked out of her online
account until 2 a.m., at which time she booked a 6 a.m. flight
home.166
AA moved for summary judgment, which was denied in part
and granted in part.167 Defendant asserted that the plaintiff’s
state law claims were preempted by the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) because § 44902 concerns aviation safety which
occupies an area that FAA intended to regulate.168 Although the
court acknowledged the evidence that the plaintiff had assaulted
a CSM, it nonetheless found that AA had not demonstrated that
the plaintiff’s reservation was canceled due to a safety con-
cern.169 Interestingly, the court distinguished the long line of
cases regarding a captain’s authority to refuse transportation
based on his belief that a passenger might be inimical to safety,
and the court questioned whether § 44902(b) even applies to a
CSM.170 Therefore, the court denied AA’s motion for summary
judgment on that issue.171
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
A. THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
This past year saw a number of preemption cases dealing with
the Federal Aviation Act (FAAct). This included two significant
preemption cases from within the Second Circuit: Jones v. Good-
rich Corp. and Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. Tong.172
162 Id. at *1.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at *2.
166 Id. at *3.
167 Id. at *1.
168 Id. at *3.
169 Id. at *7.
170 Id. at *6.
171 Id. at *8.
172 Jones v. Goodrich Corp., No. 3:12-cv-01297-WWE, 2019 WL 4760113, at *1
(D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2019); Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65,
68–69 (2d Cir. 2019).
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In Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. Tong, the court utilized
a two-step field preemption analysis to hold that a runway statute
(Runway Statute)173 was preempted by the FAAct.174 The Tweed-
New Haven Airport (Tweed) serves the New Haven area, with a
population in excess of 1,000,000 people.175 Runway 2/20, the
Airport’s primary runway, is 5,600 feet long.176 Runway 2/20 “is
one of the shortest commercial airport runways in the country”
and the shortest runway for an airport with a population area as
large as Tweed’s.177 This has precluded the airport from offering
nonstop flights to Orlando, and from offering flights to a num-
ber of East Coast cities such as Boston, Washington D.C., and
Atlanta.178 Tweed has been unable to attract new airlines, since
many cannot safely fill their planes or land safely.179
But, “[i]n 2009, the Connecticut legislature, seeking to pre-
vent the expansion of Runway 2/20, passed the Runway Stat-
ute.”180 The law provides that “ ‘Runway 2-20 of the airport shall
not exceed the existing paved runway length of five thousand six
hundred linear feet,’” thereby preventing Tweed from “ex-
tending Runway 2/20 past its current length.”181
Connecticut argued that, because the Runway Statute “does
not prevent Tweed from complying with any federally-mandated
safety standards,” implied preemption is not warranted.182 Con-
necticut also argued “that the FAAct does not preempt the Run-
way Statute because . . . no federal mandate requires that Tweed
extend its runway.”183
The Second Circuit rejected both of Connecticut’s argu-
ments. First, it clarified that this case does not involve conflict
preemption as the state suggested, but rather field preemption
because “Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy
[a field] exclusively” and “the FAAct to occupy the entire field of
air safety including runway length.”184 Second, it held that the
preemption analysis did not turn on whether the “airline safety
173 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 15-120j(c).
174 Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth., 930 F.3d at 75.






181 Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 15-120j(c)).
182 Id. at 75.
183 Id.
184 Id. (quoting Air Transp. Ass’n v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 220 (2d Cir. 2008)).
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activity” is mandated by the federal government, but instead on
whether the Runway Statute intrudes into “the field of air
safety.”185 The court concluded that the Runway Statute did so
intrude into the field of air safety, and was therefore preempted
by the FAAct.186
The court concluded that the Runway Statute fell “well within
the scope of the FAAct’s preemption because of its direct impact
on air safety.”187 The statute was “incompatible with the FAAct’s
objective of establishing [a] ‘uniform and exclusive system of
federal regulation in the field of air safety.’”188 The court fur-
ther reasoned that “[i]f every state were free to control the
lengths of runways within its boundaries, [the] Congressional
objective could never be achieved.”189
Jones v. Goodrich Corporation applied the holding of Tweed.190
The Jones case arose from the crash of an Army helicopter at
Fort Benning, Georgia, which was powered by a Rolls-Royce 250-
C30R/3M engine.191 Plaintiffs submitted that moments before
the crash that killed the occupants, the Full Authority Digital
Electronic Control (FADEC) computer, which controls fuel me-
tering and other parameters, experienced a “step count fault,”
which caused a failure.192 A step count fault was “caused by,
among other things, a faulty fuel metering valve potentiometer
(MVP).”193 “The fault caused the FADEC to enter a fixed fuel
mode where the pilot [could not] alter fuel flow and power to
the engine.”194
Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that, because
the Army required “both the baseline [engine] and all of the
modifications, including modifications to the FADEC, to be FAA
certified,” and because “[a]ny changes in equipment that were
required by the Army also required the Original Equipment Man-
ufacturers [OEMs] to obtain additional FAA certification,” the
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 74.
188 Id. (citing Air Transp. Ass’n, 520 F.3d at 224 (quoting City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639, (1973))).
189 Id.
190 Jones v. Goodrich Corp., No. 3:12-cv-01297-WWE, 2019 WL 4760113, at *1
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suit was preempted through implied field preemption like in
Tweed.195
Plaintiffs disagreed and argued that:
(1) [t]he circumstances of Tweed do not speak to implied field
preemption or to any issues arising in the instant litigation; (2)
[t]he FAA’s interest and involvement with aircraft engine-compo-
nent design and certification is insufficient to position such is-
sues within the preempted realm of air safety; and (3) [t]he
subject military aircraft is not subject to FAA certification
requirements.196
Finally, plaintiffs submitted that their manufacturing defect
claims should survive a finding of field preemption.197
The district court disagreed with plaintiffs and affirmed that
this matter solely involves field preemption because the Second
Circuit has long held and confirmed repeatedly that Congress
intended the FAAct to preempt the entire field of aviation
safety.198 It further applied Tweed’s two-factor test in that, once
the first prong is met, the court then examines whether state
laws “intrude” or “enter [within] the scope of the preempted
field in either their purpose or effect,” or more broadly,
whether they “interfere” with a federal regulation.199 The court
held that it did, and that “[p]laintiffs’ state law claims of strict
liability, negligence, breach of warranty, breach of contract,
[and] fraud were field preempted” and dismissed on summary
judgment.200
In Belmont v. JetBlue Airways Corporation, plaintiff sued JetBlue
Airways Corp. (JetBlue) in state court, asserting claims including
“false arrest, unlawful imprisonment, defamation of character,
and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress.”201 Plaintiff took his family members to JFK for their
flight.202 He received a gate pass, helped his family onto the
plane, then deboarded and left JFK.203
The next day he was arrested by the Port Authority for:
195 Id. (emphasis added).
196 Id. at *3.
197 Id. at *6.
198 Id. at *5.
199 Id. at *2–3.
200 Id. at *7.
201 Belmont v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 401 F. Supp. 3d 348, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
202 Id.
203 Id. at 352–53.
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his actions in boarding the aircraft at the [JetBlue] Terminal and
charged . . . with criminal impersonation in the second degree,
in violation of section 190.25 of the New York Penal Law, and
unlawful use or possession of official police cards, in violation of
section 14-108-1 of the New York City Administrative Code.204
Plaintiff was released a day later, and the charges were ultimately
dropped and sealed.205 After Plaintiff sued in state court, JetBlue
removed the action on the argument that the FAAct does not
provide for personal injury claims, and plaintiff moved to re-
mand to state court.206 But the court agreed with plaintiff—his
claims, all being personal injury in nature, were not preempted
by the FAAct, and therefore his suit was remanded back to state
court.207
In Carroll Airport Commission v. Danner, the Carroll County Air-
port Commission (Commission) petitioned for abatement of a
nuisance, seeking to require a farmer, Danner, to cease opera-
tion of and raze his twelve-story grain elevator.208 The structure
was located near a municipal airport.209 However, the FAA had
issued a “‘no-hazard’ letter” concerning the structure.210
Following a bench trial, Iowa’s trial court granted the air-
port’s petition and issued an injunction.211 It also ordered Dan-
ner to pay a fine of $200 a day while the elevator remained.212
Danner, having been given a clearance by the FAA, appealed.213
The state court of appeals affirmed.214 Danner applied for fur-
ther review to the Iowa Supreme Court, which was granted.215
The Commission argued that his structure was in no way pre-
empted by the FAAct, either through conflict or field preemp-
tion, because the FAAct did not expressly preempt state and
local restrictions on height of structures in or near flight
paths.216
204 Id. at 353.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 362.
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On review, the Iowa Supreme Court actually agreed with the
Commission and held the FAAct did not preempt local zoning
regulations.217 However, the Iowa Supreme Court still found
that the farmer’s “grain leg constitute[d] a nuisance and hazard
to aviation,” and ordered Danner to remove the structure.218 As
a parting gift, the Iowa Supreme Court struck down the $200
daily penalty for each day that the structure remained after the
opinion was rendered as inequitable.219
In Helicopters for Agriculture v. County of Napa, Helicopters for
Agriculture, a Part 137 operator (Operator), challenged a Napa
County law limiting the take-off and landing locations of heli-
copters used for agricultural operations.220 The new law also
prohibited “any new personal use of airports or heliports.”221
The Operator asserted the law was preempted by the FAAct.222
The Northern District of California held that the FAAct did not
preempt this law because it did not concern safety.223 Addition-
ally, this statute did not affect commercial airlines and was there-
fore allowed to stand.224
Farelas v. Hijazi concerned the removal to federal court based
on federal preemption of a case arising out of the decision of an
air traffic controller (ATC).225 Plaintiffs pled state law claims
arising out of a fatal plane crash at the Riverside Municipal Air-
port.226 They sued twelve defendants, including air traffic con-
trol operator Serco Inc. “for negligence, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, wrongful death, and a surviv[al] action.”227
The court denied a remand because air traffic control agents
directly impact the “safety” of air operations and the state law
claims are preempted by the FAAct.228
217 Id. at 655.
218 Id. at 654.
219 Id. at 655.
220 Helicopters for Agric. v. Cnty. of Napa, 384 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1038–39
(N.D. Cal. 2019).
221 Id. at 1038.
222 Id. at 1039.
223 Id. at 1040–41.
224 Id. at 1041.
225 Farelas v. Hijazi, No. 5:19-cv-00176-RGK-SHK, 2019 WL 1553669, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 9, 2019).
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228 Id. at *3.
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Finally, as of this writing, there has been a conclusion to the
closely-watched case of Avco Corp v. Sikkelee.229 Plaintiff Jill Sik-
kelee contended that Avco Corp. (Avco) sold a defective aircraft
engine that was installed on an airplane that lost power shortly
after takeoff in July 2005, killing her husband.230 Avco filed a
petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court after an ap-
peal to the Third Circuit.231
The Third Circuit held that Avco was not entitled to summary
judgment on an impossibility-preemption basis, despite acknowl-
edging that the manufacturer had to get the design approved by
the FAA before it could be produced.232 Significantly, the major-
ity acknowledged the manufacturer could not alter the engine’s
type certificate and carburetor design without FAA approval.233
However, the majority then concluded the manufacturer was
“not stuck with the design initially adopted and approved” by
the FAA.234
To the majority, the summary judgment record, viewed in a
light most favorable to Sikkelee, suggested that the manufac-
turer: (1) received approval for prior type-certificate amend-
ments, and (2) repeatedly communicated with the FAA about
purported carburetor issues in the field, but (3) did not seek
FAA approval to amend the type certificate to address those pur-
ported issues.235 Given its view of these distinct facts, the major-
ity concluded that compliance with both federal and state law
was not “impossible.”236
The dissent would have applied impossibility preemption.237
It explained that the Supreme Court, in its previous decisions in
Wyeth, PLIVA, and Bartlett, had created a bright-line rule that,
“when federal regulations prohibit a manufacturer from altering
its product without prior agency approval, state-law claims im-
posing a duty to make a different, safer product are pre-
229 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 907 F.3d 701, 704 (3d Cir. 2018),
reh’g denied, (Dec. 11, 2018), cert. denied Avco Corp. v. Sikkelee, No. 18-1140, 2020
WL 129536 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2020).
230 Id.
231 See generally Avco Corp. v. Sikkelee, 139 S. Ct. 2765 (2019).
232 Sikkelee, 907 F.3d at 711–12, 716.
233 Id. at 713.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 714.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 717.
2020] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 245
empted.”238 The dissent explained that in the aviation context,
manufacturers cannot make design changes without FAA ap-
proval, meaning conflict preemption rightly applied.239
Avco Corporation petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari on March 1, 2019.240 Jill Sikkelee waived her re-
sponse,241 and both parties filed blanket consents.242 In late
April 2019, seven entities filed amicus briefs.243 Respondent filed
her opposition on May 22, 2019.244 Avco filed a reply June 4,
2019.245
On June 24, 2019, the Court asked the Solicitor General for
his views on whether the FAAct preempts state law claims alleg-
ing that a product’s design was defective, i.e., applying impossi-
bility preemption.246 But, on January 13, 2020, the Supreme
Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari.247 It appears
compliance with both federal and state law was not “impossible.”
238 Id. at 720 (citing Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013); PLIVA,
Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009)).
239 Id. at 722–23.
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the United States as Amicus Curiae, Sikkelee, 139 S. Ct. 2765 (No. 18-1140), 2019
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B. THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
A hot topic of preemption litigation under the 1978 Airline
Deregulation Act (ADA) in 2019 was state employee laws versus
federal preemption. Two cases came before their respective cir-
cuits but ended in differing outcomes. In Air Transportation Ass’n
of America v. Washington Department of Labor, the court held that
Washington’s Paid Sick Leave Law (WPSLL) is not preempted
by the ADA because the law does not “sufficiently impact the
rate, routes, or services offered by the airlines.”248 The law re-
quired that the airlines give its employees based in Washington
a certain amount of paid sick leave each year.249 Because the
airlines could not show that this actually impacted consumers or
the prices of tickets, the court held that WPSLL can be applied
to flight crew employees.250
In contrast, in Brindle v. Rhode Island, Rhode Island’s Sunday
and holiday pay schedules were preempted by the ADA.251 Rhode
Island’s law that governed Sunday and holiday pay was found to
be sufficiently “related to” price, route, or service of air carrier,
and thus, was expressly preempted by the ADA.252 The Rhode
Island law would require airlines to pay Sunday and holiday pre-
mium time to its Rhode Island workers, which would increase
the airline’s labor costs.253 This, in turn, would “affect the cus-
tomer service that [was] provided” at the airports and cause the
airline “to modify the services that it provide[d] on those partic-
ular days” so as to significantly impact prices, routes, or
services.254
The decisions in both cases were appealed: Air Transportation
to the Ninth Circuit,255 and Brindle to the Supreme Court.256
However, on January 13, 2020, the Supreme Court denied certi-
orari in Brindle.257
248 Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Wash. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 410 F. Supp. 3d
1162, 1166 (W.D. Wash. 2019).
249 Id.
250 Id. at 1179.
251 Brindle v. R.I. Dep’t of Lab. & Training, 211 A.3d 930, 931 (R.I. 2019), cert.
denied, 140 S. Ct. 908 (2020).
252 Id. at 935, 937–38.
253 Id. at 933.
254 Id.
255 Filing of Appeal, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Wash. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
(9th Cir. Nov. 8, 2019) (No. 19-35937), ECF No. 1.
256 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Brindle v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 908
(2020) (No. 19-352), 2019 WL 4464065.
257 Brindle v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 908 (2020).
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In Covino v. Spirit Airlines, plaintiff Covino, pro se, sued Spirit
Airlines (Spirit) because a flight attendant allegedly yelled at
her and would not let her use the lavatory on a flight from Las
Vegas to Boston in April 2017.258 Covino sued for emotional dis-
tress.259 Spirit moved to dismiss the state claims based on pre-
emption.260 The court agreed with Spirit, and held that
“Covino’s claims of emotional distress based on the flight at-
tendant’s behavior toward her [were] inextricably related to the
flight attendant’s denial of an airline service.”261 Thus, Covino’s
claims were preempted by the ADA, and Spirit’s motion to dis-
miss was granted.262
In Hughes v. Southwest Airlines Co., Hughes sued Southwest Air-
lines (Southwest) for canceling his flight because they ran out of
de-icing fluid.263 Hughes subsequently brought this putative
class action lawsuit alleging breach of contract and negligence
and seeking consequential damages on behalf of all Southwest
customers whose flights were similarly canceled on the day of his
flight, as well as on other days.264 The court held that the claims
were preempted by the ADA, and dismissed that cause of ac-
tion.265 However, the court left the door open to Hughes (and
his class) by stating that the breach of contract claim could be
repleaded.266 Hughes filed an amended complaint realleging
breach of contract, and Southwest again moved to dismiss.267
The court found that Hughes again had failed to sufficiently
plead the elements necessary to assert a claim for breach of con-
tract.268 Moreover, he failed to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, and the court determined that, after his second
bite at the apple, further leave to amend the complaint would
be futile.269 The court granted Southwest’s motion to dismiss
and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice.270
258 Covino v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 3d 147, 149 (D. Mass. 2019).
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 151.
262 Id. at 154.
263 Hughes v. Sw. Airlines Co., No. 18 C 5315, 2019 WL 1375927, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 26, 2019).
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id. at *3.
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In Dolan v. JetBlue, an airline customer brought a putative class
action against JetBlue alleging violations of the Florida Decep-
tive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUPTA), unjust enrich-
ment, and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) violations arising out of JetBlue keeping a portion of
the fee charged for trip insurance sold on its website.271 JetBlue
filed a motion to dismiss.272 The district court allowed the claims
to proceed because the ADA does not preempt unjust enrich-
ment and FDUTPA claims.273
In Scarlett v. Air Methods Corp., patients filed a putative class
action against air ambulance service providers, Air Methods Cor-
poration and Rocky Mountain Holdings, LLC, to recover excess
payments they had allegedly made.274 The “United States inter-
vened.”275 The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado
dismissed the complaints, and the patients appealed.276 The
Tenth Circuit held, among other holdings, that the air ambu-
lance providers “[could] raise the ADA’s preemption provision
as a defense” since they qualified as “air carriers”; thus, the
ADA’s preemption provision “[did] not prohibit [the] court
from declaring that . . . no express or implied-in-fact contracts
were formed,” and that the patient’s “unjust enrichment claim
[was] pre-empted by the ADA.”277
C. THE AIR CARRIER ACCESS ACT
Haxton v. American Airlines, Inc. involved Air Carrier Access Act
(ACAA) preemption in the context of common law negligence
and statutory civil rights causes of action under California law.278
The plaintiff, an elderly woman with mobility problems, alleged
that, over her protest, an AA ticket counter agent at Los Angeles
International Airport (LAX) instructed her to surrender her
personal wheelchair to be checked as baggage.279 An attendant
transported her to the gate in an airport wheelchair but insisted
on leaving her there without the wheelchair.280 Feeling dehy-
271 Dolan v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 385 F. Supp. 3d 1338, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
272 Id.
273 Id. at 1346.
274 Scarlett v. Air Methods Corp., 922 F.3d 1053, 1057 (10th Cir. 2019).
275 Id. at 1058.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 1061, 1068.
278 Haxton v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-10287-RGK-PLA, 2019 WL
4284513, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2019).
279 Id.
280 Id.
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drated sometime later, she fell while hobbling to a nearby kiosk
for some water.281
The plaintiff asserted causes of action for negligence as well as
breach of California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act and Disabled Per-
sons Act.282 The court noted that, in the Ninth Circuit, the
ACAA and its pervasive implementing regulations preempt the
standard of care that an airline owes to a disabled passenger
(like the plaintiff).283 However, a disabled passenger can none-
theless proceed with a state law remedy by alleging that the air-
line breached a duty owed under the ACAA and its
regulations.284 The court found that the plaintiff pled a plausi-
ble claim for negligence by alleging that AA had violated the
regulation permitting a passenger to bring a manual, collapsible
wheelchair into the aircraft cabin.285 However, the court held
that the alleged violations of the regulations failed to state
claims under the state civil rights statutes.286
Dilldine v. American Airlines addressed preemption under the
ACAA.287 After AA allegedly destroyed Dilldine’s medications,
Dilldine sued for negligence and breach of contract.288 The
court held that Dilldine’s breach of contract claim was allowed
under AA’s contract of carriage, but the negligence cause of ac-
tion was dismissed due to the ACAA.289
In Mennella v. American Airlines, a disabled passenger was de-
nied drinks or help in first-class.290 His reaction allegedly led to
a diverted landing and arrest upon landing.291 Plaintiff claimed
that he should have been provided help with his wheelchair and
sued for negligence for his unspecified “injury.”292 However, the
court held that claiming an unspecified injury is not strong
enough to survive preemption.293
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id. at *2.
284 Id. at *3.
285 Id. at *2–3.
286 Id. at *4.
287 Dilldine v. Am. Airlines Inc., No. 3:18-cv-178, 2019 WL 3821789, at *1 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 15, 2019).
288 Id. at *1–2.
289 Id. at *4.
290 Mennella v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 17-21915-CIV, 2019 WL 1429636, at *1
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 29, 2019).
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IV. 737 MAX LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
Two accidents involving the same model aircraft, The Boeing
Company (Boeing) 737-8 aircraft (in conjunction with 737-9
model, the 737 MAX) have led to a number of lawsuits for
wrongful death of the passengers and crew, lost earnings of pi-
lots at affected airlines, and lawsuits pleading other forms of
damages.294 The investigations of the accidents and the various
lawsuits present a number of interesting legal issues that could
have an effect on future FAA regulatory action, congressional
oversight, and lawsuits that concern aircraft type certification
and safety assessments.
First, all three branches of government are involved in the
investigations of the accidents: Executive (FAA and National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)), Legislative (House of
Representatives Committee on Transportation, among others),
and Judicial (lawsuits filed for both accidents).295 This dynamic
has created an active cross-pollination of data between these va-
rious branches of government. Additionally, the various types of
lawsuits filed create unusual issues with respect to collateral use
of evidence, admissions, and verdicts from some cases being in-
troduced in other cases. While all the lawsuits find a genesis in
the two accidents, the theories of liability, causes of action, and
forms of relief differ dramatically.
The first accident involved a 737 MAX that crashed on Octo-
ber 29, 2018, during operation by PT Lion Mentari Airlines
(Lion Air) over the Java Sea near Indonesia.296 All 184 passen-
gers and five crewmembers were killed.297 There were no survi-
vors.298 A second accident involving the same model aircraft
occurred March 10, 2019, during an Ethiopian Airlines (EA)
flight, which crashed approximately six minutes after takeoff
294 Sinéad Baker, Here Are All the Investigations and Lawsuits that Boeing and the
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from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.299 All 149 passengers and eight
crewmembers were killed.300
The 737 MAX was equipped with a Maneuvering Characteris-
tics Augmentation System (MCAS).301 That system has become
the focus of the investigation into the crashes.302 The NTSB has
found that MCAS appears to have been responsible for chang-
ing the attitude of both aircraft when no correction was war-
ranted.303 The root cause of that change in attitude may have
been sensors designed to measure angle of attack (AOA) that
appear to have malfunctioned.304
Within ten days of the Lion Air crash, the FAA issued Emer-
gency Airworthiness Directive No. 2018-23-51 (AD No. 2018-23-
51).305 AD No. 2018-23-51 noted an analysis by Boeing of the
“potential for repeated nose-down trim commands of the hori-
zontal stabilizer” if one AOA sensor provided an erroneously
high input to the flight control system.306 The FAA stated that—
if not addressed—the condition “could cause the flight crew to
have difficulty controlling the airplane, and lead to excessive
nose-down attitude, significant altitude loss, and possible impact
with terrain.”307 AD No. 2018-23-51 required a revision of the
certificate limitations and revisions to the flight manual in the
event of a need for “runaway horizontal stabilizer trim
procedures.”308
The day after the EA crash, on March 11, 2019, the FAA is-
sued a Continued Airworthiness Notification to the Interna-
tional Community.309 This message did not ground the 737
MAX aircraft.310 The FAA stated that some sources were noting
299 Id. at 3.
300 Id.
301 Id. at 1, 4.
302 Natalie Kitroeff et al., The Roots of Boeing’s 737 Max Crisis: A Regulator Relaxes
Its Oversight, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/27/
business/boeing-737-max-faa.html [https://perma.cc/VP59-AHSY].
303 Id. at 3–4.
304 Id.
305 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AD NO. 2018-23-51, EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DI-
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similarities between the Lion Air and EA losses but that the FAA
had not yet reached that conclusion.311 The FAA noted the steps
it had undertaken subsequent to the Lion Air loss.312
On March 25, 2019, the European Union (EU) Aviation
Safety Agency (EASA) issued Emergency Airworthiness Directive
2019-0051-E that grounded the 737 MAX model aircraft in all
EU countries.313 EASA also issued Safety Directive 2019-01 (SD
2019-01), which forbid any flights of 737 MAX aircraft in EU
airspace by any operator, regardless of country of origin.314 SD
2019-01 noted the FAA actions to date.315 EASA said that it
could not exclude that similar causes led to the crash of the two
flights and for that reason was grounding the 737 MAX within
EU airspace.316
Three days following the EA crash, the FAA issued an Emer-
gency Order of Prohibition that both grounded 737 MAX air-
craft for U.S. certified operators and prohibited any other entity
to operate the aircraft in the United States.317 The order allowed
non-passenger ferry flights by special flight permits only.318 That
Emergency Order remains in effect as of the time of submission
of this article.319
A number of lawsuits were filed in federal court in the North-
ern District of Illinois arising from the two losses.320 Boeing
maintains its corporate headquarters in Illinois, which is the ba-
sis for the venue selection and for assertions of personal jurisdic-
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 EUR. UNION AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY, AD 2019-0051-E, EMERGENCY AIRWOR-
THINESS DIRECTIVE 1–2 (Mar. 25, 2019), https://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/2019-
0051R1 [https://perma.cc/2V2W-MJL9].
314 EUR. UNION AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY, SD 2019-01, SAFETY DIRECTIVE 2 (Mar.
12, 2019), https://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/SD-2019-01 [https://perma.cc/67LS-
D2LK].
315 Id. at 1.
316 Id.
317 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., EMERGENCY ORDER OF PROHIBITION 1 (Mar. 13,
2019), https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/media/Emergency_Order.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NRV2-CA99].
318 Id. at 2.
319 The FAA issued a Continued Airworthiness Directive on March 20, 2019,
that followed the grounding order. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., CONTINUED AIRWOR-
THINESS NOTIFICATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/media/CAN-2019-05.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5NKU-XBRP].
320 Baker, supra note 294.
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tion in that district.321 The Lion Air lawsuits consist of multiple
complaints filed by various law firms representing passenger es-
tates.322 The EA lawsuits have also been filed in the same court
and consolidated.323 Discovery is underway in these cases, prima-
rily in the form of voluntary document exchanges among the
parties.324 Plaintiffs in the EA crash cases recently expressed in a
joint status report their intent to file a master complaint, which
each plaintiff can then endorse as it chooses.325 The defendants,
presently Boeing and Rosemount Aerospace, will file master an-
swers thereafter.326
Boeing has not filed a forum non conveniens (FNC) motion
in either of the two sets of cases.327 Boeing representatives did
say at an early stage of the Lion Air cases in 2019 that it would
consider a motion to dismiss on that basis.328 No passenger on
the Lion Air flight was a U.S. resident. Eight passengers on the
EA flight were U.S. residents.
At recent hearings in the U.S. House of Representatives, the
President of Boeing was asked about his intentions to seek a dis-
missal of the Lion Air cases based on FNC—he responded that
he was not aware of the company’s legal strategy in this re-
gard.329 The Chairperson of the House Committee on Infra-
321 David E. Rapoport & Keith Jacobson, Will Boeing’s Recent Move to Chicago
Mean That More Commercial Airliner Crash Cases Will Be Litigated There?, 2001 ISSUES
AVIATION L. & POL’Y 22201, 22209 (2003).
322 See, e.g., Complaint, Rosita v. Boeing Co., No. 19-cv-05973 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6,
2019).
323 Consolidation Order, In re Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET 302 Crash, No.
1:19-cv-02170 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2019), ECF No. 513.
324 See, e.g., Docket, In re Ethiopian Airlines, No. 1:19-cv-02170, ECF Nos. 547,
569, 741.
325 Id. at ECF No. 568; see also Amended Joint Status Report, In re Ethiopian
Airlines, No. 1:19-cv-02170, ECF No. 567.
326 Amended Joint Status Report at 15, In re Ethiopian Airlines, No. 1:19-cv-
02170, ECF No. 567.
327 Docket, In re Ethiopian Airlines, No. 1:19-cv-02170, passim.
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ture, Following Recent Hearing on the Boeing 737 MAX (Nov. 15, 2019) [herein-
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structure has followed up with a series of written questions to
Boeing, which include the FNC issue.330 This creates an unusual
situation for a defendant in a civil case, where another branch of
government is trying to use its subpoena power to compel an-
swers that would disclose the defendant’s legal strategy. Typi-
cally, those queries would not be permitted by an adversary in a
lawsuit due to the attorney work–product doctrine and attor-
ney–client privilege.
In light of the congressional investigation and oversight of the
FAA, as well as the FAA investigation of these two accidents, the
plaintiffs in the EA lawsuit have issued demands that cross over
to these branches of government.331 Plaintiffs have demanded
all data that Boeing produced to Congress.332 Boeing has re-
served its rights to oppose producing all data it sent to Congress
and has agreed to produce “relevant documents.”333 Plaintiffs
also demanded all data that Boeing exchanged with the FAA
during its investigation.334 Boeing has countered with agreeing
to relevant and “non-privileged correspondence and documents
exchanged between Boeing and the FAA regarding the 737 Max
from October 29, 2018 to March 10, 2019.”335
Boeing faces other lawsuits that could create similar issues of
disclosure, admissions, and ultimately collateral estoppel with
regard to the wrongful death cases. For example, the union for
Southwest pilots (SWAPA) filed a lawsuit in Texas state court at
Dallas County (later removed to federal court) in which it al-
leges damages to all pilots employed by the airline due to the
grounding.336 It alleges that Southwest was the single largest
user of the 737 MAX before the grounding.337 The removal peti-
tion states that federal law preempts state law because the collec-
tive bargaining agreement of the union is governed exclusively
by federal statutes.338
330 See DeFazio Press Release, supra note 328, at 9.
331 See Amended Joint Status Report at 4, In re Ethiopian Airlines, No. 1:19-cv-
02170, ECF No. 567.
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335 Id. at 10.
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Additionally, a number of shareholder derivative actions were
filed by owners of Boeing stock.339 The lawsuits claim that the
representations of Boeing executives misled the investors and
caused them financial losses.340 A similar lawsuit was recently
filed against Boeing directors by one family that appears to seek
more than just money damages and perhaps a change in man-
agement personnel.341 These lawsuits will focus on what the Boe-
ing executives stated to the public at various junctures, whether
those representations were false or misleading, and if the com-
pany knew or had reason to know the accuracy of its state-
ments.342 Those findings could be used in the other lawsuits to
varying degrees in the form of deposition testimony, admissions,
and ultimately a trial verdict, if the jury responds to specific
questions that have application in the related cases.
Some of the complaints pleaded involvement by the FAA in
the certification process for the aircraft and allocate some fault
to the FAA for allegedly insufficient critical review of MCAS.343
This supposedly was due in part to a lack of FAA personnel with
the necessary pilot credentials to provide critical analysis of the
operational aspects of MCAS as it relates to pilot reaction and
interface with other aircraft systems.
Suing the U.S. government requires satisfying procedural re-
quirements. The Federal Tort Claims Act allows lawsuits against
the United States and its agencies (e.g., Department of Trans-
portation or FAA) for negligence claims in the same manner as
private individuals, including for officials who act in the course
of their work.344 An exception exists, however, if an official was
exercising discretion in their decisions, even if they abuse that
discretion.345 Suing the FAA would require plaintiffs to establish
that the FAA did not exercise its discretion with regard to the
737 MAX design approval process.346
339 E.g., Complaint, Seeks v. Boeing Co., No. 1:19-cv-02394 1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9,
2019), ECF No. 1.
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341 Docket Report, Kirby Family Partnership v. Boeing Co., No. 2019-0907
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343 Consolidated Class Action Complaint at ¶ 53, In re Boeing Co. Aircraft, No.
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345 Id. § 2680(a) (2018).
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A number of governmental bodies have been involved in the
investigation of the cause(s) of these two accidents. The NTSB
issued a Safety Recommendation Report on September 19,
2019.347 The report is entitled Assumptions Used in the Safety
Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indi-
cations on Pilot Performance.348 The NTSB report addresses
whether Boeing complied with certain federal regulations and
the advice of FAA advisory circulars with respect to predicting
the likely outcome of a failure of a system accompanied by mul-
tiple alerts or other prompts that require pilot attention, consid-
eration, and potential action.349 The NTSB concluded that
Boeing’s assessment of the effects of MCAS on pilots did not
comply in that regard.350
The NTSB noted that both crashes (Lion Air and EA), as well
as the preceding Lion Air flight “on the accident airplane with a
different flight crew” all shared common attributes.351 During
rotation, the left (captain) stick shaker activated.352 The left and
right AOA sensors varied by about twenty degrees.353 The left
and right altitude and airspeed indicators also varied.354 After
flaps were retracted, an automated nose-down stabilizer trim in-
put occurred of ten second duration.355 The crew countered
with manual inputs, but each time the automated system pro-
vided another nose-down trim input.356
On the incident prior to the Lion Air crash, the NTSB noted
that the crew experienced the issue throughout the flight but
was able to avoid a nose-down attitude of the magnitude exper-
ienced in the subsequent flight and the Ethiopian flight.357 On
the Lion Air crash, the NTSB said the Digital Flight Data Re-
corder (DFDR) captured more than twenty of these automated
trim inputs in six minutes.358
2019/03/29/why-fixing-the-faa-designee-program-is-not-a-matter-of-money/#544
d30c4220b [https://perma.cc/E7X7-XHZ6].
347 See NTSB MCAS REPORT, supra note 296, at 1 n.1.
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Several federal regulations and advisory circulars concern the
process for assessment of safety of newly implemented flight
control systems. One regulation requires that the design of a
“stability augmentation system” or other similar automated sys-
tem allow for counteraction of certain specified failures without
“exceptional pilot skill or strength” to deactivate or override the
system.359 Advisory Circular (AC) 25-7C touches on the same
topic by noting a manufacturer should expect that a pilot will
attempt to counter any short term changes to forces affecting
flight path by re-trimming or changing configuration or flight
conditions.360 The NTSB said that Boeing predicted in its safety
assessment that continuous “[u]nintended stabilizer inputs”
(e.g. the type experienced on these accident flights) would be
recognized by pilots as a runaway stabilizer or trim failure and
the relevant manual “procedure for runaway stabilizer would be
followed.”361
The NTSB report concluded that the Boeing assessment of
pilot reaction was erroneous because it did not consider “all the
potential alerts and indications that could accompany a failure
that also resulted in uncommanded MCAS operation.”362 The
NTSB went on to say that the Boeing safety assessment did not
evaluate “how the combined effects of alerts and indications
might impact pilots’ recognition of which procedure(s) to pri-
oritize” when faced with an MCAS failure.363
As a result of this analysis, the NTSB report recommended
two major action items: (1) that Boeing reassess the MCAS sys-
tem failure modes with consideration of all alerts and indica-
tions in the cockpit in order to evaluate pilot likely reactions;
and (2) that Boeing arrange for relevant system design enhance-
ments and pilot training needed to account for the expected
reactions of pilots in these circumstances.364 The report also
contained other recommendations, including coordination of
these changes with EASA officials.365
As of the time of publication of this article, some lawsuits aris-
ing from the two crashes were reportedly settled. The grounding
359 14 C.F.R. § 25.672(b) (2020).
360 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AC NO. 25-7C, FLIGHT TEST
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361 NTSB MCAS REPORT, supra note 296, at 6.
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of all 737 MAX aircraft continues in the EU and in the United
States.
V. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general (all-pur-
pose) and specific (case linked).366 Both bases for jurisdiction
have been revisited over the past several years by the U.S. Su-
preme Court. It has confirmed that general jurisdiction, absent
an extreme exception, can be exercised in only two very narrow
circumstances.367 Specific jurisdiction has evolved as well
through these recent decisions and now requires a close nexus
between the actions complained of against the defendant and
the forum state.368
These decisions are increasingly affecting the venue of avia-
tion cases. Cases involving aircraft crashes historically have been
filed in the state where the accident occurred. For a defendant
with business in every major state, a plaintiff’s prospect of ob-
taining personal jurisdiction over it was not very challenging. All
of the usual rules changed for aviation lawyers once the U.S.
Supreme Court revisited how its personal jurisdiction jurispru-
dence had evolved.
In Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Supreme Court redefined and
effectively narrowed the parameters of general jurisdiction.369
The case represented a sea change in personal jurisdiction juris-
prudence and caused every state to re-examine its laws relating
to “long-arm” jurisdiction so that the application of those laws
remains within the bounds of the Due Process Clause to the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Due Process
Clause).370 The paradigm bases for general jurisdiction for a
corporation are its place of incorporation and its principal place
of business, each of which “have the virtue of being unique—
that is, each ordinarily indicates only one place—as well as easily
ascertainable.”371 These bright-line rules afford plaintiffs “at
least one clear and certain forum in which a corporate defen-
dant may be sued on any and all claims.”372
366 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779–80
(2017).
367 Id. at 1780.
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369 See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
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The Supreme Court held general jurisdiction cannot be exer-
cised in every state where a corporation “engages in a substan-
tial, continuous, and systematic course of business,” a
formulation the Court held would be “unacceptably grasp-
ing.”373 Otherwise, “ ‘at home’ would be synonymous with ‘doing
business’ tests framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in the
United States.”374
Moreover, “the general jurisdiction inquiry does not focus
solely on the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.
General jurisdiction instead calls for an appraisal of a corpora-
tion’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide.”375
“It is one thing to hold a corporation answerable for operations
in the forum [s]tate . . . quite another to expose it to suit on
claims having no connection whatever to the forum [s]tate.”376
The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in BNSF Railway
Co. v. Tyrrell cemented Daimler’s impact on jurisdictional juris-
prudence.377 The Court rejected jurisdiction over a defendant
despite a long-arm statute directed to persons or companies
“found in” the state.378 Although the defendant had extensive
personnel and property in the state, it was neither incorporated
nor maintained its principal place of business there and conse-
quently could not be subjected to in personam jurisdiction.379
The Supreme Court has also significantly narrowed the bases
for specific jurisdiction over the past five years, but it remains a
more fact-intensive two-step inquiry. First, a court must find that
the long-arm statute of the forum state authorizes jurisdiction
over the defendant.380 Then, the court must find that the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant accords with the
constitutional requirements of the Due Process Clause.381
Where the long-arm statute extends personal jurisdiction to the
extent permitted by the Due Process Clause, the statutory in-
quiry necessarily merges with the constitutional inquiry, and the
two inquiries become one.
373 Id. at 138.
374 Id. at 139 n.20.
375 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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Specific personal jurisdiction can be exercised if a defen-
dant’s minimum contacts with the forum state form the basis for
the claims in question.382 The lynchpin for jurisdiction is
whether the cause of action arises from the defendant’s actions
in the state.383 In most states, it requires something more than
“but for” causation, instead rising to the level of something akin
to legal or proximate causation.
Many long-arm statutes retain wording that permits the exer-
cise of jurisdiction even where a defendant allegedly has caused
tortious injury through actions outside the state.384 If a defen-
dant regularly does or solicits business, or engages in a persis-
tent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from
goods used or services rendered in a state, those facts alone
should no longer justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction
where the acts at issue occur exclusively outside the forum.
In Walden v. Fiore, the Court emphasized that “the defendant’s
suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with
the forum [s]tate” based on (1) contacts between the defendant
itself and the forum state, without regard to the connections be-
tween the plaintiff and the forum; and (2) defendant’s contacts
with the forum state itself, not with persons who reside there.385
“[I]t is the defendant, not the plaintiff or third parties, who
must create contacts with the forum [s]tate.”386 Walden relied on
an earlier decision where the court held that an individual’s
contract with an out-of-state party alone cannot automatically es-
tablish sufficient minimum contacts to permit the exercise of
personal jurisdiction.387
In Bristol-Myers, the Court rejected the California Supreme
Court’s affirmation of a sliding-scale method of assessing juris-
diction.388 In the words of the majority, that approach of aggre-
gating more contacts unrelated to the plaintiff was nothing
more than a “loose and spurious form of general jurisdic-
tion.”389 This one decision has been the most controversial of all
382 Id.
383 Id. at 1561 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
384 E.g., V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5 § 4903 (2019).
385 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014).
386 Id. at 1125.
387 Id. at 1122–25 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475
(1985)).
388 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781–82
(2017).
389 Id. at 1781.
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recent decisions with respect to the scope of its application in
specific jurisdiction cases.390
The application of these decisions generally to aviation cases
has been inconsistent. Some courts continue to rely upon
cases—that are ten or more years older—from their own states
or federal circuits as the legal basis for exercising personal juris-
diction.391 Cases that predate Daimler and its progeny remain a
source of authority for courts that want to resist implementation
of the new constraints on personal jurisdiction set down by the
Supreme Court. Other courts openly acknowledge the new re-
gime and are not hesitant to reject personal jurisdiction as viola-
tive of due process rights.392
The Central District of California refused to exercise jurisdic-
tion over an engine manufacturer that did not sell the subject
engine in the forum.393 The Court noted that the stream of com-
merce theory from World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson is now in
doubt in light of more recent Supreme Court decisions.394 It
held that the sale of an engine in Tennessee to a third-party,
who installed the engine and sold the aircraft, which eventually
made its way to the forum state, does not satisfy the require-
ments for a causal connection that permits specific
jurisdiction.395
In Schaefer v. Synergy Flight Center, the Illinois Appellate Court
for the First District found jurisdiction over an engine overhaul
company that performed no work in the forum on the subject
engine.396 The case relied on two prior Illinois Supreme Court
decisions—one from 1961—as well as one U.S. Supreme Court
decision, which was referenced only in passing.397 While the
Schaefer court quoted the wording cause of action “relates to de-
fendant’s [conduct in] the forum,” the remainder of the deci-
390 Michael P. Daly, Federal Courts Continue to Split Over Whether They Have Per-
sonal Jurisdiction Over Claims Brought by Non-Forum Class Members Against Non-Forum
Defendants, 9 NAT’L L. REV. 149 (2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
federal-courts-continue-to-split-over-whether-they-have-personal-jurisdiction-over
[https://perma.cc/A3PK-BYES].
391 See, e.g., Schaefer v. Synergy Flight Ctr., 2019 IL 181779-U (Ill. App. Ct. May
13, 2019).
392 See, e.g., Perry v. Jabiru Aircraft Pty., No. LACV-17-8536-VAP, 2018 WL
6321643 (C.D. Cal. Aug 3, 2018).
393 Id. at *1.
394 Id. at *4 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)).
395 Id. at *3.
396 Schaefer, 2019 IL 181779-U, at *1.
397 Id. at *2.
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sion never touched on explaining how that criterion was
satisfied.398 Instead, the court discussed how the defendant de-
rived substantial revenue from the state and then sold a product
that eventually made its way into the state.399
In a similar case, Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Garcia, the Texas Court
of Appeals found jurisdiction over a defendant that manufac-
tured a part one of its approved vendors installed in the forum
state two years before the plaintiff’s accident.400 Cessna Aircraft
(Cessna) was not in privity with plaintiffs and had performed no
activity in Texas related to the crankshaft at issue.401 Instead, it
sold the part to a Cessna authorized service center and that en-
tity installed the part.402 The Court relied on Cessna’s unrelated
sales of aircraft that eventually are operated in Texas as a basis
for exercising jurisdiction.403
The court in Erwin-Simpson v. Berhad rejected a plea of general
jurisdiction over an airline based on its website and marketing
activity in the forum.404 The court held that no amount of mar-
keting targeted at the forum would render the defendant “at
home” in the forum.405 For that reason, the court also denied
jurisdictional discovery as an exercise in futility.406
Recently, in Menard v. Textron Aviation Inc., a federal court in
Wisconsin found jurisdiction over two defendants with regard to
engines designed and manufactured outside the forum as well
as serviced entirely outside the forum.407 No contract between
plaintiff and the defendants was signed in the forum.408 The
court relied heavily on a Seventh Circuit decision from 2010.409
The Menard court found specific jurisdiction based in part on
274 unrelated engines from the manufacturer ending up in the
forum.410 The court found specific jurisdiction over the mainte-
398 Id.
399 Id.
400 Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Garcia, No. 13-17-00259-CV, 2018 WL 6627602 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Dec. 19, 2018, pet. filed).
401 Id.
402 Id.
403 Id. at *4.
404 Erwin-Simpson v. Berhad, 375 F. Supp. 3d 8, 10–11, 19 (D.D.C. 2019).
405 Id. at 19–21.
406 Id. at 21.
407 Opinion and Order at 1–3, Menard v. Textron Aviation, Inc., No. 3:18-cv-
00844 (W.D. Wisc. Oct. 24, 2019), ECF No. 57.
408 Id.
409 Id. passim.
410 Id. at 13.
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nance, repair, and operating supplies (MRO) firm because it
had been “subcontracted” by a company with an office in the
forum.411 The court held that the “arising out of” nexus for spe-
cific jurisdiction was satisfied in part by the MRO firm shipping
a loaner engine into the forum for customer use during the
overhaul.412
In federal court and in some state courts, a party cannot ap-
peal the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal juris-
diction until the case ends, absent a motion for leave to file an
interlocutory appeal.413 This delay renders an appeal somewhat
of an illusory remedy for an arguably erroneous decision on per-
sonal jurisdiction. The parties will have devoted significant re-
sources to litigate the merits of the case, only to seek a new trial
in an alternate venue on the basis that jurisdiction was not
permissible.
For the foreseeable future, we can expect to see many courts,
both state and federal, continuing to apply prior law on per-
sonal jurisdiction in order to justify the denial of motions to dis-
miss. The single most challenging aspect of the change in the
law for courts and litigants to absorb is the discounting in spe-
cific jurisdiction cases of extensive forum contacts that bear no
relation to the product or service at issue. Those unrelated con-
tacts were historically the forum activity that would result in sus-
taining even the most marginal of personal jurisdiction pleas.
Changes of this magnitude in the law require time for lower
courts to both absorb and apply these principles in a consistent
manner.
VI. UNMANNED SYSTEMS
The legal landscape around unmanned systems is still a rela-
tively new area, as the FAA only introduced Part 107 (Part 107)
relating to the rules for operating Commercial Unmanned Air-
craft Systems (UAS) in 2016.414 Prior to the introduction of Part
107, the FAA was processing ad hoc Section 333 applications for
commercial use of unmanned systems.415 As such, the law re-
lated to unmanned systems is evolving and will in the future pre-
411 Id. at 1–2, 4.
412 Id. at 3, 7.
413 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291–92 (2018).
414 14 C.F.R. § 107 (2016).
415 What is the FAA 333 Exemption?, DRONE PILOT GROUND SCHOOL, https://
www.dronepilotgroundschool.com/kb/what-is-the-faa-333-exemption/ [https://
perma.cc/ZTR5-9FHU].
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sent many unique issues specific to unmanned systems versus
manned flights, regarding operating rules—particularly beyond
visual line of sight—and federal preemption.
Foletta v. Ellis, an unreported case from the Court of Appeals
First District, Division 5 in California, draws a line that local gov-
ernment may not cross in regulating drone use before being
preempted by federal authority.416 This case arose from a dis-
pute between neighbors and briefly touches on the issue of pre-
emption.417 After plaintiff, Foletta, reported his neighbor to
county authorities for engaging in “unlicensed commercial ac-
tivit[y],” Ellis began a series of harassing behaviors including fly-
ing a drone “at Foletta about six to ten feet over his head.”418
Foletta obtained a restraining order against Ellis which, in part,
prohibited him from flying drones over Foletta’s property.419
Ellis challenged the order, arguing that it was “invalid to the
extent it prohibits him from flying drones . . . over the Foletta
property because air space use is governed by the [FAA].”420 The
court evaluated “whether the federal government’s regulation of
air space generally is intended to preempt the authority of states
to regulate harassment that involves that air space” and found
that it did not.421
Additionally, in late November 2019, the FAA “announced
two important expansions of the Low Altitude Authorization
and Notification Capability (LAANC).”422 The LAANC “auto-
mates the application and approval process for drone [pilots] to
obtain airspace authorizations” in controlled airspace.423 The
FAA announced that the LAANC capability is now active at “Bal-
timore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport,
Dulles International Airport, William P. Hobby Airport in Hous-
ton and Newark Liberty International Airport.”424 As of March
416 Foletta v. Ellis, No. A153079, 2019 WL 1091049, at *1–2 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
Mar. 8, 2019).
417 Id.
418 Id. at *1.
419 Id. at *2.
420 Id.
421 Id.
422 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., LAANC DRONE PROGRAM EXPANSION CONTINUES 1
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2020, seven additional companies have been approved by the
FAA to provide LAANC services.425
LAANC “directly supports the safe integration of UAS into the
nation’s airspace, [and] expedites the time it takes for drone
pilots to receive authorizations to fly under 400 feet in con-
trolled airspace.”426 LAANC also provides pilots with an aware-
ness of where they can and cannot fly. The program is
“accessible to all pilots who operate under the FAA’s small
drone rule (Part 107)” and “was expanded in July to provide
near real-time airspace authorizations to recreational flyers.”427
LAANC provides airspace authorizations only. Pilots must still
check notices to airmen (NOTAMs) and weather conditions
before they fly.
A. PROPOSED RULE RE: REMOTE IDENTIFICATION OF UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
The FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
on December 31, 2019, concerning mandatory identification
(ID) of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) by remote means.428
The comment period ended on March 2, 2020.429 The stated
purpose is for both situational awareness of air traffic control
managers and law enforcement.430
The current process for UAS registration is limited to a physi-
cal marking on the unmanned aircraft itself combined with fil-
ing a registration with the FAA.431 The use of Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and radio commu-
nications with FAA air traffic control (ATC) were considered
and rejected due to the saturation of the available radio fre-
quencies by the high number of UAS.432
The FAA proposes a three-year phase-in for the new remote
ID technology.433 Manufacturers of UAS would be required to
integrate a remote ID system into each unmanned aircraft with
425 Id.
426 Id. at 2.
427 Id.
428 Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 84 Fed. Reg. 72438-
01 (Dec. 31, 2019).
429 Id.
430 Id. at 72438–40.
431 Id. at 72439–40.
432 Id.
433 Id. at 72439.
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a compatibility as required by the FAA.434 Each system would
need to (1) allow a remote ID message in near real time with the
FAA; (2) secure the remote ID data; (3) meet FAA contractually
required technical parameters; and (4) inform the FAA when
the system is active or inactive.435
The NPRM applies to both recreational and commercial use
UAS.436 Operators would be obliged to follow the remote ID re-
quirements, regardless of who owns the UAS.437
B. AERONAUTICAL KNOWLEDGE AND SAFETY TEST
The FAA’s Reauthorization Bill introduced new rules for how,
when, and where you can fly your drone for recreational pur-
poses. . . . The law requires that all recreational flyers must pass a
knowledge and safety test. . . . The knowledge test is being devel-
oped in three phases: (1) Test Content—the FAA, with input
from drone stakeholders has developed the content for the
knowledge test; (2) Development of requirements for knowledge
test administrators with input from the drone community; [and]
(3) Selection of knowledge test administrators—anticipated early
2020.438
In mid-September, “the FAA issued a Request for Information
(RFI) seeking input from stakeholders on aeronautical knowl-
edge and safety test administration requirements that the
agency will apply to future knowledge test administrators.”439
Based on those responses, the FAA “selected stakeholders to
make recommendations on the administration of the test,”
which “will assist the agency in developing requirements that po-
tential test administrators must meet through an onboarding
process.”440 The FAA also invited several organizations “to pro-
vide input to the aeronautical knowledge and safety test admin-
istration requirements.”441 The results will be announced on
www.faa.gov.442
434 Id. at 72460–61.
435 Id. at 72422.
436 Id. at 72439.
437 Id. at 72440.
438 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AERONAUTICAL KNOWLEDGE AND SAFETY TEST UP-
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VII. DUE PROCESS
Several decisions came down in 2019 related to personal liber-
ties before and in flight. In Abdi v. Wray, an airplane passenger
sued the directors of several federal agencies in a challenge to
his placement on the federal government’s terrorist watch list.443
Plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to “enhanced screening
measures,” and that his status as a known or suspected terrorist
was disseminated “to state and local authorities, foreign govern-
ments, corporations, private contractors, airlines, gun sellers,
car dealerships, financial institutions, among other official and
private entities and individuals.”444 Plaintiff alleged that all of
those actions violated his Fifth Amendment rights to substantive
and procedural due process and the Administrative Procedure
Act.445 Plaintiff sought declarative and injunctive relief.446
The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah granted de-
fendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.447 Plain-
tiff appealed.448 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied a
fundamental-rights approach to assess the substantive due pro-
cess claim.449 It held that (1) plaintiff’s allegations did not
“state[ ] a substantive due process claim, because [the] impedi-
ments [did] not substantially interfere with his ability to travel”;
(2) “the government’s conduct did not deprive [plaintiff] of a
liberty interest in travel” in violation of procedural due process;
and (3) plaintiff failed to “plausibly state a procedural due pro-
cess claim under” the “stigma-plus standard,” meaning that
plaintiff failed to plead (a) the utterance of a statement suffi-
ciently derogatory to injure his or her reputation, that is capable
of being proved false, and that he or she claims is false, and (b)
a material state-imposed burden or state-imposed alteration of
the plaintiff’s status or rights.450
In Kashem v. Barr, several U.S. citizens alleged that their inclu-
sion on the No Fly List—“which prohibit[ed] them from board-
ing commercial aircraft flying to, from, or within United States
or through United States airspace”—violated the Due Process
443 Abdi v. Wray, 942 F.3d 1019, 1023 (10th Cir. 2019).
444 Id. at 1024.
445 Id. at 1024–25.
446 Id. at 1024.
447 Id.
448 Id.
449 Id. at 1026.
450 Id. at 1024–25, 1031–32, 1033–34 (emphasis added).
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Clause.451 The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon en-
tered summary judgment in the government’s favor.452 Plaintiffs
appealed.453
The Ninth Circuit held that: (1) the criteria used to deter-
mine whether to place these individuals on the No Fly List were
not unconstitutionally vague because the individuals “had fair
notice that his conduct would raise suspicion under the crite-
ria”;454 (2) the “No Fly List criteria [used by the Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC) were] governed by constitutionally suf-
ficient standards . . . as applied”;455 (3) the government’s use of
“the reasonable suspicion standard satisfies procedural due pro-
cess” in determining whether to place individuals on No Fly
List;456 (4) the government’s failure to provide a complete list of
reasons for including plaintiffs on the No Fly List did not violate
the Due Process Clause;457 (5) the letter notifying plaintiff that
he was being placed on the No Fly List because of concerns
about the nature and purpose of his travel to Yemen did not
violate the Due Process Clause;458 (6) the “unclassified summa-
ries [provided by the government to justify its decision to place
plaintiffs on the No Fly List] afforded the plaintiffs a meaningful
opportunity to tailor their responses to the subject matter of the
government’s concerns”;459 (7) “the opportunity [for individuals
placed on the No Fly List] to provide written responses was suffi-
cient to satisfy due process . . . and live [adversarial] hearings
were not required”;460 and (8) due process did not require the
district court to use “procedures specified for handling classified
information in criminal cases.”461
In Kovac v. Wray, Muslim citizens of the United States who
were identified in the federal terrorist screening database sued
several federal officials, alleging violations of, among other
things, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the Due Process Clause.462 The named plaintiff,
451 Kashem v. Barr, 941 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 2019).
452 Id.
453 Id.
454 Id. at 373–74 (emphasis in original).
455 Id. at 374.
456 Id. at 381.
457 Id. at 383.
458 Id. at 385.
459 Id. at 385–86.
460 Id. at 389.
461 Id. at 389–90.
462 Kovac v. Wray, 363 F. Supp. 3d 721, 731 (N.D. Tex. 2019).
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Adis Kovac, challenged his placement on the No Fly List, while
four additional plaintiffs challenged their placement on a “Se-
lectee List,” which means they were subjected to mandatory air-
port screenings.463 The government moved to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.464
The Northern District of Texas held that: (1) the FAAct did
not “limit the jurisdiction of the district court[ ]” so as to pre-
clude subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) Mr. Kovac’s pleading
that his placement on the No Fly List plausibly pleaded a sub-
stantive due process claim, procedural due process claim, and
APA claim.465 However, the court held that the Screening List
plaintiffs had failed to state a substantive due process claim, as
they failed to show they had been prevented from traveling, only
showing that they experienced delays.466 The court further held
that Congress “[did] not violate the non-delegation doctrine”
when it empowered the Transportation Security Administration
to create and maintain a database on individuals “who may pose
a risk to transportation or national security.”467
463 Id. at 734–35.
464 Id. at 738.
465 Id. at 741, 744, 751, 759.
466 Id. at 752.
467 Id. at 721.
